Roy uses her incisive approach to the process of de-development to articulate the relationship between Israel and Palestine wherein a true development process is effectively undermined and prevented. In her article “ De-development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society since Oslo,” Sara Roy effectively demonstrates how Palestinians experienced “severe economic decline, social regression, and political repression” as a direct result of the accords.
#Ozzle accords free#
All in all, the Oslo Accords were effectively weakened in being treated “not as a basis for an evolving partnership, but as an array of legalistic and public relations weapons that can free Israel of its commitments, prevent further transfers of Palestinian territory to Palestinian control, and delegitimize Arafat and the idea of a Palestinians state in the mind of Israeli public opinion.”
Lustick argues in “ The Oslo Agreement as an Obstacle to Peace” that “opponents of the principles of compromise…can interpret, stall, complicate, and even thwart it by prematurely (from the point of view of its supporters) treating the agreement as a legal codex rather than a political framework.” Lustick was acutely aware that the Israeli and American opponents of Oslo had chosen to “undermine the peace process by demystifying its grand claims” and simply arguing that the Palestinians were not to be trusted. Even without the benefit of hindsight, many JPS contributors have issued clear-eyed assessments of the accords over the years.Ĭlick here to read JPS‘s Special Virtual Issue: The Failure of the Oslo Accordsīrushing aside the collective euphoria that affected so many in the international community at the time, Ian S. To commemorate the anniversary, the Journal of Palestine Studies has published a special virtual issue, “ The Failure of the Oslo Accords,” which features some of the best articles analyzing the Oslo Accords and its discontents.
Far from providing the foundations of a workable and just peace agreement, the Oslo Accords should now be understood for what they have always been, in the words of Edward Said: “an instrument of Palestinian surrender” as the “primary consideration in the document is for Israel’s security, with none for the Palestinians’ security from Israel’s incursions.” While nearly any sign of substantive progress was a welcome development in the Arab-Israeli conflict amidst the First Intifada, any serious analyst could see just how unfavorable the terms of the agreement actually were for Palestinians. But Palestinians and analysts who had a deeper understanding of the implications of the agreement issued prescient warnings about what was in store for Palestine after Oslo.
Many in the international community initially celebrated the signing of the Oslo Accords and viewed it as the opening of a new era in Palestinian-Israeli relations. Twenty-five years ago, the iconic images of Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin enthusiastically shaking hands on the White House lawn were splashed on the front page of nearly every major newspaper. As we mark the 25th anniversary of the Oslo Accords, the Journal of Palestine Studies releases a special online, virtual issue assessing the outcomes.
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